Western University

Scholarship@Western
MPA Major Research Papers

Local Government Program

7-1-2015

Institutional Collective Action in Ontario’s Fire
Service: Conducive and Inhibiting Factors of Local
Collaboration of Fire Safety Inspections and
Enforcement
Brian Arnold
Western University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lgp-mrps
Part of the Public Administration Commons
Recommended Citation
Arnold, Brian, "Institutional Collective Action in Ontario’s Fire Service: Conducive and Inhibiting Factors of Local Collaboration of
Fire Safety Inspections and Enforcement" (2015). MPA Major Research Papers. 139.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lgp-mrps/139

This Major Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Local Government Program at Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in MPA Major Research Papers by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact
tadam@uwo.ca, wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Institutional Collective Action in Ontario’s Fire Service:
Conducive and Inhibiting Factors of Local Collaboration of Fire Safety Inspections and
Enforcement

MPA Research Report

Submitted to
The Local Government Program
Department of Political Science
The University of Western Ontario

Brian A. Arnold
July 2015

i
ABSTRACT
Institutional Collective Action in Ontario’s Fire Service: Conducive and Inhibiting
Factors of Local Collaboration of Fire Safety Inspections and Enforcement

Ontario’s fire departments are obligated to provide fire prevention services to their
respective communities. The Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997, is largely
permissive legislation leaving the mechanism for delivery of these services to the
discretion of local governments. The economic, political and social environment,
however, is placing increased pressures on fire chiefs and elected officials to do more
with less. Within the individualized contexts of municipalities’ needs and circumstances,
the prospect of mandated training requirements for Chief Fire Officials and Assistants to
the Fire Marshal coupled with increased regulatory responsibilities for fire safety
inspections and enforcement is increasing demands on already constrained resources.
Adopting Institutional Collective Action as the theoretical framework for this research, the
conducive and inhibiting factors of voluntary collaboration of fire prevention activities
were found to be consistent with the literature. Although perceived resistance by
organized labour is a barrier to improved fire prevention activities, association
representation does not explain the dearth of formalized fire prevention agreements
across the province. Chief administrative officers and elected officials are perceived to
be receptive to collaborative arrangements, yet how the issue makes it to the council
agenda is unclear. Fire chiefs seem to be receptive to the net benefits of collaboration,
yet a question remains whether they are advocating informal or formal alternative
service delivery mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
There are 453 municipal and northern fire protection fire departments in the province
of Ontario. The capacity of each fire department to conduct fire safety inspections and
enforce the Ontario Fire Code (OFC) varies widely by locality. Minimum responsibilities
for inspection bureaus include acting upon complaints or requests, adherence to
required frequencies for specific occupancies, and approval of fire safety plans. Many
fire departments only have the resources to conduct inspections on a complaint or
request basis while other fire departments cannot meet the regulatory requirements for
inspections of facilities housing senior citizens, our most vulnerable population.
Further, the level of service provided with fire safety inspections differs greatly
between communities. Voluntary certification and inadequate training of fire inspectors is
an ongoing debate within the industry. From an inspection perspective alone, plans
examination, fire alarm, detection and suppression systems, and a multitude of
interpretive aspects involving the OFC, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA),
Canadian Standards Association, as well as working knowledge of applicable Technical
Safety Standards Association and Electrical Safety Authority requirements demand a
thorough understanding, continuing education and regular practice. While the Building
Code Act specifies qualifications for building inspectors under various disciplines (BCA,
s.15.11), the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 (FPPA) is silent for fire inspector
qualifications. Indeed, NFPA professional qualifications for any fire service position,
including Fire Inspector Level 1 and 2 certifications, are not mandatory in the province.
Fire Underwriters Survey (FUS) provides inspection frequency recommendations
based on the type of occupancy (Table 1.1). These are considered industry best
practices for residential and commercial fire insurance rate classifications. Most fire
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departments are unable to meet these guidelines or industry best practices, however,
some fire services have modified the recommended frequencies to longer intervals.
Table 1.1 Inspection Frequency Benchmarks by Occupancy Classification
Occupancy
Classification

Description

FUS
Benchmark

A1

Assembly – production and viewing of the performing arts

6 months

A2

Assembly – not elsewhere classified in Group A

6 months

A3

Assembly – arena type

6 months

A4

Assembly – occupants gathered in the open air

6 months

B1

Detention

6 months

B2

Care and Treatment

6 months

B3

Care

6 months

C

Residential

6 months

D

Business and Personal Services

12 months

E

Mercantile

12 months

F1

High Hazard Industrial

3 months

F2

Medium Hazard Industrial

6 months

F3

Low Hazard Industrial

6 months

Source: Fire Underwriters Survey: Routine Fire Prevention Inspection Program (2013)

As the fire service matures in its realization that voluntary inspection programs are not
sufficient for public safety and as communities continue to grow, additional legislative
and regulatory requirements within the FPPA and OFC can be reasonably anticipated,
exposing further gaps in regulatory enforcement and increasing municipal liability.
The province of Ontario’s public fire safety policy employs a balanced and flexible
approach to local implementation that relies on three components: a) public fire and life
safety education, b) fire prevention activities, which include fire safety inspections of
buildings and enforcement of the OFC through the use of tickets, orders and
prosecutions, and c) emergency responses (Communique, 2014). Collectively, these
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principles are known within the fire service community as the “three lines of defense”
and are necessary for municipalities to achieve their fire safety outcomes. This paper
argues, however, that an historic and continued preoccupation for emergency response,
with its emphasis on fire suppression personnel and a focus on highly asset-specific
capital items such as fire trucks and stations, have changed little since the FPPA was
enacted. Although classified as the third line of defense, emergency response, which
includes mutual aid and dispatching, accounts for the largest proportion of fire service
collaborations in Ontario. A reactive, rather than proactive, fire protection approach that
allocates the majority of its resources and investments to suppression activities is to the
detriment of optimal public fire safety.
In the current social, economic and political context, it is important to study public
safety activities as municipalities allocate a significant percentage of operating budgets
to police, fire, and emergency medical services (Carr and LeRoux, 2005). Fire services
have slowly, if not reluctantly, adopted New Public Management style managerial
techniques, which focus “mainly in the direction of cutting costs and doing more for less
as a result of better-quality management and different structural design” (Hood, 1991).
Municipalities are expected to find alternative service delivery mechanisms that increase
cost efficiencies and realize economies of scale while concurrently meeting professional
and service-level standards (Andersen and Pierre, 2010). Exploring mechanisms to work
collaboratively with neighbouring fire departments in order to improve the efficacy of fire
prevention programs should be a priority for all fire chiefs, councils, local services boards
and the province.
1.2 Research Question
The research question is “What are the conducive and inhibiting factors of
voluntary collaboration for fire prevention activities within Ontario’s fire service?”
Adopting the theoretical framework of Institutional Collective Action, three hypotheses
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are advanced in order to expand upon the literature to evaluate the extent of acceptance
or resistance by key stakeholders, specifically fire chiefs and firefighter associations, to
voluntarily collaborating with other fire departments for fire prevention services.
H1: The higher the level of a fire chief’s education, the greater the benefits of
collaboration will be positively perceived
H2: If the workplace is unionized, then firefighters would oppose collaboration
H3: If the fire chief felt his/her position or authority was at risk, then he/she would
oppose collaboration
1.3 Legislative Framework
The requirements for local governments to provide specific services, vis-à-vis the
three lines of defense, are notably vague. The FPPA states:
Every municipality shall,
(a) establish a program in the municipality which must include public
education with respect to fire safety and certain components of fire
prevention;
There are no schedules within the Act with which to adhere, notwithstanding the recent
issuance of O. Reg. 364/13 mandating annual inspections and fire drill observations of
care occupancies, care and treatment occupancies, and retirement homes that house
society’s most vulnerable populations. There are no other regulations mandating
inspection frequencies based on major building occupancy groups.
Fire inspectors have legislative authority and responsibility under ss. 19 (2) of the
FPPA as Assistants to the Fire Marshal to conduct fire safety inspections of buildings
and structures for the purpose of ensuring that owners are compliant with the regulation.
The OFMEM currently has no minimum training or certification requirements for
appointments as an Assistant to the Fire Marshal. That practice is likely to change,
however, to mirror O. Reg. 150/13 that requires training of Chief Fire Officials who are
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responsible for reviewing and approving fire safety plans for vulnerable occupancies.
This is the first mandated minimum training of a member of the fire service in Ontario.
The FPPA is permissive legislation that allows for alternative service delivery
mechanisms by municipalities for fire protection services, including service agreements
between municipal fire departments. The Act states:
2. (5) A municipality may, under such conditions as may be specified in the
agreement, enter into an agreement to,
(a) provide such fire protection services as may be specified in the
agreement to lands or premises that are situated outside the territorial
limits of the municipality; and
(b) receive such fire protection services as may be specified in the
agreement from a fire department situated outside the territorial limits
of the municipality. (FPPA, ss.2.(5))
This subsection of the Act permits mutual aid agreements and the provision of services
to and receipt of services from outside of the municipality. The decision on service
production may only be limited by language within collective agreements restricting or
prohibiting contracting out of services. The portion of the Act enabling automatic aid
reads:
2. (6) A municipality may enter into an automatic aid agreement to provide or
receive the initial or supplemental response to fires, rescues and
emergencies. (FPPA, ss.2.(6))
These are generally formalized agreements, perhaps as a fee for service, which requires
a stipulated response by the contracted fire department upon notification.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Mutual Aid and Emergency Response
Academics have conducted some research on voluntary collaborations amongst fire
departments but almost no literature exists regarding activities beyond emergency
response, particularly fire prevention. The primary focus of such literature is on riskspreading through mutual aid. Mutual aid has been described as a form of asset
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specificity in which time-sensitive and site-specific dependence on human and
technological intervention is imperative (Williamson, 1991). Shrestha (2008) explains the
notion of site and temporal specificity is rooted in mitigation of uncertainty where
jurisdictions do not have the resources to increase fire suppression resources for
underserviced border areas. Agreements are reached with multiple providers to reduce
the risk of a single provider being unable to provide assistance due to a simultaneous
emergency (Shrestha, 2008).
Mutual aid agreements rely on good faith and trust amongst participants to the
agreement as the parties “are under no obligation to furnish assistance when requested
if providing such aid would… jeopardize their capacity to provide the service to their own
residents” (Andrew, 2009, 134). While maintaining the local autonomy of constituent
municipalities, mutual aid agreements allow for the provision or receiving of assistance
in an emergency upon request (Andrew and Hawkins, 2012). Wood’s PhD thesis (2004)
noted that mutual aid in the Kansas City metropolitan region extended not just beyond
city jurisdictions, but also county and occasionally state geopolitical boundaries.
Spicer’s PhD dissertation (2013) found that the 18 separated cities in Ontario are not
forming collaborative arrangements at a high rate with their regional neighbours. His
thesis utilizes the ICA framework and points to the challenges that growth and
development in rural municipalities place on the traditional urban-rural divide. In his
research, however, Spicer found that mutual aid and fire dispatch agreements between
separated cities and their lower tier neighbours were, by far, the predominant
collaborative agreements between the separated city and the upper tier municipality
(Spicer, 2013).
Hatley’s PhD thesis (2010) explored the attempted voluntary consolidation of the five
municipal fire departments within the metropolitan Detroit area. Despite the net benefits
with an agreed upon cost sharing formula and the considerable effort and time expended
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in forming a consolidated fire authority, the initiative failed. It was found that elected and
appointed officials perceive collaborations differently. If either perceives past interactions
negatively, it may be sufficient to prevent serious discussions on collaboration (Hatley,
2010). “It is important to future local government actors considering collaboration to have
a better understanding of what role these perceptions play in determining the success or
failure of collaboration activity” (Hatley, 2010, 184). The political context and preferences
of political actors is a key lesson learned from the Detroit experience.
The formation of institutional ties within the public safety sector through formal and
informal interlocal arrangements (ILA) has been extensively studied by Andrew (2006;
2009; 2012). He determined that the characteristics of public safety as a public good or
service not only impacted transaction costs, but significantly influenced the type of ILA
adopted. A single functional service area, such as the fire service, has its own distinct
homogeneity of policy goals and preferences which can reduce the transaction costs of
contract negotiations, maintenance and enforcement and lead to an adaptive agreement
(Andrew, 2006).
2.2 Linking Building Inspectors to Fire Inspectors
As previously stated, there is no academic literature available pertaining to voluntary
collaborations for fire prevention activities. Applied research projects for the Executive
Fire Officer program at the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland have
concentrated on regionalization and consolidation of specific cities or districts within
various states outside of the ICA framework, thus did not factor into this literature review.
Shrestha’s contribution (2010) raised possibilities for predicting factors conducive to
fire prevention collaborations through findings of reciprocal arrangements for building
inspectors. Like fire inspectors, building inspectors have great specialization and a
responsibility for public safety. While fiscal considerations for cost efficiencies may be an
initial driver for discussion amongst institutional actors, improved effectiveness and
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service level standards through adaptive and reciprocal agreements may become the
sustaining and primary outcome.
Fire prevention activity collaborations can achieve economies and reduce fire
hazards. Such efficiencies and risk reduction limit the frequency of mutual aid, thereby
reducing labour costs, dollar losses and negative externalities. Thurmaier and Wood
(2002) found in the case study of Johnson County, Missouri’s contractor licensing and
building code enforcement ILA, the impetus for collaboration of building inspectors ”was
primarily increased regulatory effectiveness, with an expected outcome of greater public
safety in buildings” (Thurmaier and Wood, 2002, 595). Eliminating the fragmentation
caused by 22 different building enforcement codes throughout its municipalities was the
key driver for collaboration.
2.3 The Problem of Fragmented Policy
Fragmented decision making is a direct result of delegation of roles and
responsibilities from a central authority, such as the provincial government, to
municipalities and local agencies (Feiock, 2009). Although Oakerson and Parks (2011)
state that the delegation of roles and responsibilities can improve local resilience and
responsiveness, delegation also creates ICA dilemmas (Feiock, 2009; Feiock & Scholz,
2010). “ICA dilemmas arise directly from the division or partitioning of authority in which
decisions by one government in one or more specific functional area impact other
governments and other governmental functions” (Feiock, 2013, 397). ICA dilemmas are
created when vertically and horizontally fragmented decisions by one jurisdiction create
positive and/or negative externalities for another.
The focus of ICA is “on the externalities of choices in fragmented systems in which
decisions by one independent formal authority do not consider the costs or benefits that
these decisions impose on the constituencies and policy outcomes of concern to other
authorities” (Feiock and Scholz, 2010, 6). Institutional and policy fragmentation can be
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“mitigated by a high degree of intergovernmental collaboration that forms cooperative
agreements, mutual trust, and social capital that can avert collective action problems
and achieve reasonable outcomes” (Wood, 2004, 192).
It is within the context of this research that the extent of vertical fragmentation of
provincial public fire safety policy may create a dilemma of perceived ineffectual
implementation by local governments due to inconsistent and non-standardized fire
prevention activities. Whitford (2010) reasons that a delegator “wants to ensure that the
delegatee makes and implements policy within some band of acceptance” (Feiock and
Scholz, 2010, 34). The province has an interest in ensuring municipalities carry out its
public fire safety policy, however, current legislation, regulation and directives are not
overly prescriptive on municipalities. Public Fire Safety Guidelines provide municipalities
with approaches they may consider in determining local fire safety policy and
programming, but there is great debate as to the enforceability of such guidelines in the
absence of regulation or directive.
Inconsistencies between provincial interests and local implementation are not only
vertically fragmented, but also produce horizontally fragmented decisions between local
governments. When local fire prevention activities do not reduce the frequency and
severity of fires, the negative spillovers may consist of increased reliance on mutual aid,
localized economic impact due to business disruption, or environmental contamination
crossing municipal boundaries caused by smoke and water run-off. Whitford (2010) was
concerned that negative externalities caused by neighbouring municipalities may lead
some to want the central authority to guard against an erosion of the standard of quality,
which can lead to a “race to the bottom”. Some fire chiefs may welcome additional
regulation in order to “level the playing field” within their regional area, as it can be a
challenge for a municipality to compete for and retain business if it strictly enforces the
OFC and its neighbour does not.
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2.4 Institutional Collective Action (ICA) Framework
2.4.1 Working Definition of ICA
The strength of the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework is recognized by
academics studying voluntary collaboration under its various appellations. Feiock and
Scholz (2010) brought together scholars from across the spectrum who have made
contributions using similar themes under differing terminology such as multi-lateral
agreements (MLA), inter-jurisdictional agreements (IJA), inter-local agreements (ILA),
contracts, voluntary regionalization, and imposed consolidations. Collectively, they
represent the range of mitigating mechanisms, which creates the framework of ICA.
The literature review revealed a theoretical model that was adopted for this research
and data analysis; the ICA framework. ICA is a voluntary, self-organizing collaborative
arrangement between one or more municipalities for the coordination or joint provision of
a local service (Feiock, 2007; Feiock and Scholz, 2010). Feiock and Scholz (2010)
define self-organizing federalism “as the endogenous development and maintenance of
institutional mechanisms that mitigate a recognized ICA dilemma by those directly
affected by the dilemma” (Feiock and Scholz, 2010, 5). In general terms, collaboration is
“the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve
problems that cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organizations” (Agranoff and
McGuire, 2003, 4). The research is situated largely in regional and metropolitan areas of
the United States, although the ICA framework has broad applicability (Feiock and
Scholz, 2010). The model has been used in Canadian-focused research (Conteh, 2012;
Spicer, 2013) as well as small towns and rural settings (Morton, Chen and Morse, 2008;
Bel and Warner, 2015).
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2.4.2 Mitigating Mechanisms
The ICA framework can be broadly applied across the local service delivery spectrum
and provides a range of mitigating mechanisms to deal with ICA dilemmas. As
illustrated in Figure 2.1 (Feiodck and Scholz, 2010), the mechanisms range from the

Figure 2.1 Mitigating Mechanisms (Source: Feiock and Scholz, 2010)

adaptive, informal arrangement that maintains local autonomy on the far left of the
spectrum to the restrictive, formalized agreement that transfers local autonomy to
another institution on the far right. The selection of an available mechanism is
determined by the nature of the dilemma and the function or service it is intended to
advance.
2.4.3 Application and Limits of ICA
Kwon and Feiock (2010) state that inefficiencies caused by jurisdictional
fragmentation can be overcome through collaboration of service delivery responsibilities.
The ICA framework “can be applied to a wide range of policy dilemmas in which local
governing units can potentially achieve better outcomes collectively than acting
individually by reducing barriers to mutually advantageous collaborative action as
represented by the transaction costs required for achieving joint projects” (Feiock, 2013,
399). The ICA framework encompasses multiple theories in support of its approach,
including the application of “contracting and individual-level collective action to
institutional actors such as cities, counties, and government agencies” (Feiock, Lee,
Park and Lee, 2010, 242).
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Simon Andrew expands upon the work of Feiock (2007; 2009) by examining local
government decisions to enter into Inter-Jurisdictional Agreements (IJA). Andrew
discusses the network approach that encompasses the ICA framework. He emphasizes
factors such as the characteristics of goods and services, composition of contracting
parties, political institutional characteristics, and interlocal politics (Andrew, 2009).
Andrew further states that “The institutional collective action framework is an excellent
example of a model that has been developed to explore factors associated with IJA
adoption” (Andrew, 2009, 136).
ICAs, however, are not panaceas for fragmented service delivery. Collins wrote “if the
benefits are so pronounced and interest is so high, why aren’t all local governments
taking advantage of such an option?” (Collins, 2006, 3). Such is the nature of this
research. Feiock identified limits to self-organizing mechanisms due to fragmentation of
local jurisdictions in solving “diseconomies of scale, positive and negative externalities,
and common property resource problems” (Feiock, 2009, 357). As well, depending on
the transaction costs involved, IJAs are not “the only tools that can be used to achieve
meaningful regional integration” (Andrew, 2009, 139). Imposed regional authorities, for
example, may address an ICA dilemma, however, to the detriment of local autonomy.
Kwon and Feiock (2010) found that even though the potential benefits of collaboration
may be recognized, transaction cost problems of institutional design and implementation
may still exist, often due to weak relationships. Such elements would be useful for
framing any discussion of regionalization of Ontario’s fire services and the potential
barriers to such a provincial policy decision.
Ostrom (1983) cautioned that coercion and seller opportunism are detrimental to local
autonomy. “Contractual arrangements are meaningful only where instrumentalities are
independent or autonomous, capable of saying no, maintaining an arm’s-length

13
relationship when necessary, and undertaking cooperative arrangements when mutual
advantage can be gained” (Ostrom, 1983, 144).
Additionally, Andrew (2009) acknowledges that findings have been difficult to broadly
apply due to issues of measurement and an absence of comprehensive data. While
academics such as Andrew (2009), Andrew and Hawkins (2012), and Jung et al. (2013)
have attempted to produce generalizable findings of voluntary collaboration in the fields
of emergency management and fire service mutual aid, there is less evidence available
for fire prevention activities. Yet, many academics argue that these shortcomings can be
overcome through selection of the most appropriate ICA mechanism in the given
context, dependence upon networks for both informal and formal arrangements
(LeRoux, Brandenburger and Pandy, 2010), and continued research aimed at assisting
practitioners (Feiock and Scholz, 2010).
2.4.4 Transaction Costs
In economics, transaction costs are the management costs associated with planning,
adapting, and monitoring provided services (Williamson, 1981; Carr, LeRoux and
Shrestha, 2009). Transaction costs are viewed as a primary barrier to mitigating ICA
dilemmas. They include information costs, negotiation costs, external decision costs,
and enforcement costs. Such barriers to collective action are dependent on “the difficulty
or ease of search, the costliness of information, the time and effort needed in bargaining
or making decisions, and the fact that contracts required policing and enforcement”
(Whitford, 2010, 37). Critical to the transaction costs are the extent to which time and
information are available, and for the latter, accurate. “The costliness of information is
the key to the costs of transacting, which consist of the costs of measuring the valuable
attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and
enforcing agreements” (North, 1990, 27). The greater the uncertainty, the greater the net
benefits must be. Feiock (2002) and Kwon and Feiock (2010) add agency costs to the
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discussion. These occur when the preferences of elected and appointed officials
negotiating the agreement diverge from the public’s preferences.
Homogeneity of demographics, industry, building stock and geography play a role in
recognizing commonalities, including risks and preferences that can reduce transaction
costs. Feiock, Jeong and Kim (2003) found that “Knowledge of the costs and benefits of
an agreement also allows government officials to more accurately identify joint or
individual responsibilities, but this process becomes more difficult without information
concerning participant preferences and behavior” (Hawkins, 2009, 110-111).
Politicians and public service administrators do not always make decisions with
complete information or clearly defined outcomes (Andrew and Hawkins, 2012).
“Boundedly rational actors have limited capacity to gather or process information
regarding all potential costs involved in an exchange” (Feiock, Clinger, Shrestha and
Dasse, 2007, 73). Perfect information would include all transaction costs, however,
decisions are not only based on finances. “A framework based entirely on purposive
rationality, even bounded rationality, is incomplete without complements drawn from
institutional theory” (Brown and Potoski, 2003, 465). Leslie Pal (2006) defines public
policy as “a course of action or inaction chosen by public authorities to address a given
problem or interrelated set of problems” (Pal, 2006, 2). With the exception of larger
urban centres, which may employ full time policy analysts, the rational process of policy
making is not the reality for most municipalities. Tindal and Tindal (2004) support this
assertion in that “the policy making process in practice is quite different from the logical
series of interrelated steps suggested by the rational-comprehensive or classical model
of policy making” (Tindal and Tindal, 2004, 354). Lindblom argues that a limited capacity
for problem-solving, incomplete information and insufficient time for comprehensive
analysis results in an incremental approach to policy making (Lindblom, 1959). The
“muddling through” approach closely resembles that of Popper’s “piecemeal social
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engineering”, whereby social policy evolves through trial and error. This is a significant
nuance, as not all benefits and costs are immediately known for particular ICA problems
and mitigating mechanisms within varying local political, economic and social contexts.
2.4.5 Individuals as Institutional Actors
The literature suggests that individuals are composite actors and that homogeneity,
social capital and policy actors’ willingness to set aside personal and institutional selfinterest are key considerations in developing ICA arrangements. Composite actors have
positional responsibilities, possess the authority to act within prescribed limits, and have
their own personal preferences whether to act or not on behalf of the organization.
These institutional actors have the capacity to collaborate with other institutional actors
for better outcomes. Such collaboration is only achieved through local policy actors; both
appointed and elected.
These actors’ perceptions of the benefits and transaction costs of collaboration is
material to the survey conducted for this research. Carr, LeRoux and Shrestha (2009)
claim that the ICA framework bridges rational choice and institutional theories.
Furthermore, ICA “combines institutional, transaction-cost, and social-network
explanations for local government service production decisions” (Carr, LeRoux, and
Shrestha, 2009, 404). Using a broad range of solutions, institutional actors can achieve
outcomes that are efficient to achieve economies of scale, fairly distribute the benefits
and costs, and are sustainable over the long term because of adaptable incentives.
Institutional actors have positional responsibilities and the authority to act. It is
necessary that they share the benefits and costs of collaboration in a fair and equitable
manner without attempting free-riding. “If local actors pursue strategies based on their
short-term interests, then the collective action problem dictates that the outcomes of
individual decisions will be collectively inefficient in the absence of mechanisms to
integrate decisions across policies and/or jurisdictions” (Feiock, 2013, 398).
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2.4.6 Networking and Social Capital
Recognizing that appointed and elected officials make decisions for and act on behalf
of local government, ICA encompasses the capability for intentional action by individuals
for the benefit of the organization or institution. The context of social networks and
voluntary governance is dependent upon the social capacity of individuals, the nature of
institutions, and strength of relationships (Feiock, 2007). Social capital is built upon trust
and developed networks of various policy actors over time through previous informal and
formal agreements, including a positive reputation for following through on their
commitments.
While transaction costs “create a disincentive for local public officials to use interlocal
service agreements, the institutional collective action framework posits that the
transaction costs of cooperation can be mitigated by networks and networking among
local government actors” (LeRoux, Brandenburger and Pandy, 2010, 270).
2.4.7 Imposed Authority versus Voluntary Consolidation
“Fragmented governmental jurisdiction is pervasive and has long been the subject of
contentious debate over the primacy of local or regional interests” (Feiock, 2013, 397).
When public policy is slow to be implemented locally or negative externalities continue
without resolution, the province may exert its authority, which Feiock acknowledges by
stating “Solutions to fragmented authority are often imposed by statute and are designed
and coordinated by a higher level government or third party” (Feiock, 2009, 370). Feiock
goes on to say, however, that “The fragmentation and institutional complexity found in
metropolitan areas makes the imposition of standardized solutions difficult or even
impossible” (Feiock, 2009, 370). The fragmentation problem may be solved through
imposed regionalization or amalgamation, but the resultant high transaction costs do not
achieve purported economies of scale, increased efficiencies or improved effectiveness.
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When ICA dilemmas and collaboration risks continue to hinder provincial goals,
“higher level institutions have the authority to resolve the problems by changing the
geographic or functional jurisdictions to internalize the externalities” (Feiock, 2009, 361).
Farmer’s PhD thesis (2008) found that higher levels of government can impose regional
authorities. This is supported by Feiock (2009) who states “many states use regional
level special districts to mitigate the horizontal problem of metropolitan service provision
for geographic consolidation of services such as planning, resource management,
schools, or emergency services” (Feiock, 2009, 361).
Voluntary regional authorities in which individual municipalities voluntarily delegate
some of their control and decision making to a formalized body do so because
as the complexity of interactions increases, they generally involve
collective governance through decision bodies representing all or
most of the affected entities. The public administration literature
has traditionally looked to this type of governance body with
sufficient authority as the mechanism to effectively mitigate ICA
dilemmas. (Feiock, 2013, 405)
In “many fire departments in rural and small town Canada which are volunteer-based,
problems of population aging or population decline, combined with increasing
regulations around fire training standards, may mean that smaller community
departments are consolidating” (Halseth, 2006, 78). Following the forced amalgamations
of the 1990’s, however, voluntary consolidations have not been the predominant
mechanism for finding efficiencies, economies, or addressing declining pools of human
resources in Ontario’s volunteer fire departments. Aside from a long-standing practice of
outsourcing the provision of communications infrastructure and dispatching services to
larger urban centres or other public safety agencies, and reliance upon mutual and
automatic aid agreements to provide additional firefighting resources for emergency
response, IJAs are relatively sporadic in Ontario. Morton, Chen and Morse (2008) show
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that in-house provision of highly visible fire services in small towns may have more to do
with maintaining a sense of community than finding economies.
The above literature review indicates that there are mechanisms to deal with
Institutional Collective Action (ICA) dilemmas. Where local governments fail to voluntarily
collaborate in an efficacious manner to overcome externalities of choice caused by
fragmentation (Feiock, 2013), thus hindering stated policy goals of higher levels of
government, particularly in the realm of public fire safety, the risk of coercion increases
with the threat of an imposed authority mechanism. The loss of autonomy and higher
transaction costs then becomes secondary to societal expectations.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
A cross-sectional study and analysis was undertaken to collect data of relevant
variables at a specific point in time. The data was collected from various sources,
including databases from the Municipal Fire Protection Profiles/Northern Fire Protection
Profiles (MFPP/NFPP) and Municipal Analysis and Retrieval System (MARS), online
surveys sent to fire chiefs within the province, and case studies of three fire departments
experienced in collaborations of varying degrees. A fourth interview was conducted with
the OFMEM to gain the provincial perspective. The snapshot approach was selected as
it is well suited for studies that collect data on multiple variables and from geographically
dispersed participants (O’Sullivan, Rassel and Burner, 2008).
Future changes, even in the near term, in the political, social or economic
environment, would likely affect the study, analysis and potentially generate different
results. Such environmental influences may include, for example, a fire event involving
fatalities, increased regulation, new appointments in senior leadership, or significant
changes to the local economy impacting municipal revenues.
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3.1 Concurrent Triangulation Approach
A mixed-method strategy used a concurrent triangulation approach (Creswell, 2009)
by simultaneously collecting quantitative and qualitative data (McDavid, Huse and
Hawthorn, 2013). The three sources of data were:
1. Secondary data from MFPP/NFPP and MARS databases;
2. Primary data from an online survey of fire chiefs; and
3. Qualitative case study interviews.
McDavid et al. (2013) suggest that multiple sources of evidence that provide consistent
findings are much more reliable than single-source findings as “The basic idea of this
approach is that qualitative and quantitative lines of evidence are complimentary”
(McDavid, Huse and Hawthorn, 2013, 207). Secondary quantitative data from the MFPP
and MARS databases and primary quantitative data from fire chief surveys were
gathered while qualitative data was attained from interviews of various policy actors. The
qualitative aspect provides for an increased understanding of application of the ICA
framework, contextual factors and program effectiveness in attaining observed
outcomes.
Using a triangulation approach, the analysis blended the statistical interpretation of
the quantitative findings in relation to the qualitative interview process. “Mixed-methods
evaluation designs, and the triangulation approach in particular, have become a central
feature of evaluation practice in governmental and nonprofit settings” (McDavid, Huse
and Hawthorn, 2013, 208). Statistical analysis used visual representations through
charts and graphs, analysis of variance (ANOVA), as well as summaries of the
quantitative data from the questionnaires and secondary data sources. The case study
approach provided a qualitative analysis to expand upon the numbers and provide
insight into why and how voluntary collaborations work within these organizations.
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3.2 Secondary Quantitative Data
Secondary data was obtained from the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing’s
Municipal Analysis and Retrieval System (MARS) database and the OFMEM’s Municipal
Fire Protection Profiles/Northern Fire Protection Profiles (MFPP/NFPP) database. The
2013 Financial Information Returns (FIR) is the primary data collection tool as part of the
Municipal Performance Measurement Program. Annual reporting is mandatory for
municipalities, as the ministry uses the data for statistical and financial monitoring of
municipalities. For the study, FIRs were accessed online via a link to “FIR Data – By
Schedule”. Schedule 02 – Municipal Data provided populations and Schedule 40 –
Consolidated Statement of Operations: Expenditures provided fire department operating
expenses adjusted program support.
The OFMEM collects MFPP/NFPP reports from local municipalities on an annual
basis. The 2014 document requests were sent from the OFMEM to clerks and Chief
Administrative Officers (CAO), not fire chiefs, although these forms often were sent
down the chain to fire chiefs to provide the information and to return populated forms
back to the clerk or CAO. The purpose of the profiles is to collect information regarding
fire protection services for each municipality and each northern fire protection community
(Appendix A). The database compiled electronic data from fillable PDF documents for
the first time in 2014. Previous years’ submissions from municipalities were done via
hard copy. This data is kept within the MFPP/NFPP database, which is available and
accessible to the public upon request to the OFMEM. The Data, Applications and
Technical Support Division of the OFMEM verifies the validity and reliability of the
MFPP/NFPP database to the extent that the forms submitted by clerks and CAOs are
accurately populated.
The first request for the 2014 MFPP/NFPP data was made via email to the OFMEM
on 13 February 2015. Through regular email exchange and telephone conversations
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verifying required data with sample data charts, the final Microsoft Excel spreadsheet
was received from the OFMEM’s Manager of Data, Applications and Technical Support
on 10 April 2015. The data provides information on the 414 municipalities and 49 fire
protection districts within the province. It includes agreement summaries, percentage of
fire suppression (emergency response) coverage provided by a municipality or partner,
staffing breakdown by function, fire department contact information, unionization status
of the labour force, core services (emergency response), and agreement details. The
agreement details section provides the description of the types of service arrangements
between municipalities, such as mutual aid, automatic aid, dispatch, or fire prevention
services.
The secondary data from the OFMEM was used to evaluate the number of fire
prevention personnel whose primary responsibility is fire and life safety inspections, in
relation to all fire service personnel in the province, the incidence of collaborative
arrangements between fire departments, the most frequent types of collaborations, and
the prevalence of fire prevention collaborative agreements. The secondary data from the
FIRs were used as independent variables to assess population size and operating
budget with the survey responses.
3.3 Primary Data from Survey to Fire Chiefs
3.3.1 Variables
The independent variables were Population Size, Adjusted Operating Budget,
Education Level of the Fire Chief, Type of Municipality, and Type of Fire Department.
The first dependent variable, Perceived Fire Prevention Capacity, was used to determine
possible service level gaps and to gauge if collaborations were perceived as even
necessary. The other the dependent variables were based on the ICA framework and
included Demographic Homogeneity, Networking and Social Capital, Benefits of
Collaboration, Transaction Costs, and Policy Actor Resistance to Collaboration.
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Appendix B describes the dependent variables and their observed or proxy measures in
greater detail. Andrew (2009) provides a caution that the inherent difficulty of measuring
key variables will require careful operationalization and refinement. Within each category
of dependent variables, survey questions (Appendix C) were specifically designed to
extrapolate data for elements of the ICA framework
3.3.2 Online Survey
Interceptum.com was selected as the online survey provider, under software license
from Acquiro Systems Inc. operating out of Gatineau, Quebec. Potential respondents
were informed that the company’s servers are located in Quebec and it does not allow
third parties to track survey participants. Also, the provider’s terms of service agreement
and privacy policy allows for the secure collection, retention, use, disclosure, security
and disposal of personal information and is in accordance with Canada’s Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
Draft survey questions were developed and refined from mid-January and provided to
a fellow MPA candidate on 11 April 2015 followed by faculty supervisor for review and
comment on 20 April 2015. The feedback resulted in amendments to the content and
format of the survey. Caution was exercised so as not to inadvertently harm
respondents. Questions that may have alienated fire chiefs, led to embarrassment upon
reflection, or caused one to perceive potential professional harm would only serve to
promote gaming or result in non-participation. In order to keep the survey length
manageable and encourage participants to complete the survey, great care was taken to
only ask for relevant information and not create perceived intrusions. A pilot of the
survey was sent via Interceptum.com on 27 April 2015 to the seven local fire chiefs
within the Region of Waterloo and a university faculty member not associated with the
Local Government Program. Additional minor amendments were then made as a result
of the feedback. The final version with introductory letter and privacy policy were
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submitted to the Local Government Program Coordinator on 11 May 2015 to forward to
the university’s Departmental Research Ethics Committee for approval. Permission for
research on human subjects was received on 14 May 2015.
3.3.3 Target Population and Sample Size
The OFMEM secondary data was used as the basis of determining the target
population (N) of fire chiefs. There are 414 local municipalities as defined by the
Municipal Act, ss. 1, which are comprised of 173 single tier and 241 lower tier
municipalities. In addition to the 414 local municipalities, there are 49 Northern Fire
Protection Programs (NFPP) in northern Ontario. This resulted in a potential of 463
municipal and northern fire departments in Ontario.
The OFMEM provided a list of 453 fire departments, which is less than the number of
municipalities and northern fire protection districts. As Table 3.1 illustrates, there are 16
Table 3.1 Distribution of Ontario’s Fire Departments amongst Communities
• Communities with one fire department (364 municipalities and 49 NFPP communities)

413

• Municipalities with two fire departments (Brockton, Brooke-Alvinston, Frontenac Islands,
12

Huron-Kinloss, Lucan Biddulph, Plympton-Wyoming, Russell, South Algonquin, South
Bruce, Temagami, Warwick, and West Elgin)

(+24)

• Municipality with three fire departments (Arran-Elderslie)

(+3)

1

• Municipalities with 4 fire departments (Bluewater, North Dundas)

(+8)

2

• Municipality with 5 fire departments (Lambton Shores)

(+5)

1

Total

453

Source: Data, Applications and Technical Support Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management

municipalities with more than one fire department, permitted under subsection 5.(2) of
the FPPA. This adds an additional 40 contacts to the previous 413 fire departments.
The OFMEM list excluded 34 municipalities that a) do not have a fire department, b)
purchase services from other departments, and/or c) jointly operate a department that is
counted in the above communities (Appendix D). The jointly operated department is

24
Central York Fire Services, which is discussed in the qualitative analysis. The target
population (N) for the online survey was determined to be 453.
453 is considered to be a small population. O’Sullivan, Rassel and Berner (2008)
suggest that in order to achieve ±5% accuracy with a 95% confidence level, a sample of
half the population is needed. Adjusting for the 12 exclusions discussed below, 50% of
the population size 441 (N) is 220 (n), which is the sample size needed in order to
generalize the results across the province.
3.3.4 Survey Invitations and Responses
Of the 453 fire departments targeted for the online survey, 12 exclusions were made.
Seven (7) fire chiefs each split their responsibilities between two (2) fire departments.
Interceptum.com did not permit duplicate emails to be sent to the same address. As a
result, seven (7) municipal fire departments were excluded. As well, the municipality of
Bluewater has the same contact information for its four fire departments, eliminating
three (3) invitations. A further two (2) municipalities, Brockton and Brooke-Alvinston,
each with two fire departments, only received one (1) invitation apiece. The 12
exclusions resulted in 441 online surveys being sent out. The online surveys were sent
via Interceptum.com to the 441 fire chiefs on 15 May 2015. The use of online invitations
and follow-up provided the expected economization of time and effort. Four follow-up
requests were made in the form of re-invitations to potential participants.
241 responses were received. 13 responses came from non-management staff
including fire prevention officers, administrative assistants, captains, coordinators, and
chief fire prevention officers. Two responses without name, position, or email address to
verify that survey answers originated from a targeted participant were rejected. In total,
15 responses were excluded, as they did not come from or could not be confirmed that
they came from a fire chief, deputy fire chief, director, manager or similar decision-
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making position within the department. The remaining response rate of 226 participants
met the required sample size of 220 necessary for generalization of results.
3.4 Qualitative Data through Case Study Interviews
A jurisdictional scan of collective action revealed three examples of alternative
service delivery arrangements outside of the traditional emergency response realm.
They include a shared Fire Inspector position for Middlesex County, a shared Training
Officer in Wellington County, and the voluntary consolidation of Newmarket and Aurora
fire departments into the Central York Fire Services. A former fire chief in Middlesex
Centre, Ontario, Middlesex County Fire Prevention Officer John Elston was interviewed
in Ilderton on 06 July 2015. Centre Wellington Fire Department Fire Chief Brad Patton
was interviewed in Fergus on 19 June 2015. The interview of Central York Fire Services
Fire Chief Ian Laing and Deputy Fire Chief Robert Comeau regarding voluntary
consolidation was conducted in Newmarket on 12 June 2015. The interview questions
(Appendix E) provided greater understanding of the impetus for voluntary collaboration,
the inhibiting factors of collaboration, how those barriers were overcome and the
continued benefits that serve to sustain these arrangements.
An additional interview was conducted by telephone with Jim Jessop, the Interim Fire
Marshal and Chief of Emergency Management on 07 July 2015. The purpose of this
interview was to gauge the province’s view of the current state of fire prevention
activities at the local level. It proved insightful in forecasting the expected direction of fire
and life safety inspection requirements and fire department collaborations. The
discussion validated the timeliness and utility of this research as a matter of interest to
the province as pertains to its public fire safety policy.
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
4.1 Secondary Data from the OFMEM
Initial observations of the MFPP/NFPP data supports the assertion that emergency
response is the primary focus of most municipal fire departments. The numbers depicted
in Table 4.1 show that fire prevention personnel account for 3% of total fire department
staffing.
Table 4.1 Comparison of Fire Prevention Personnel to All Fire Service Personnel
Fire Prevention
Staff

Percentage of
Total
Prevention

Total Staff in
Province

Full Time

623

66.56%

11,365

Composite

40

4.27%

264

Volunteer

273

29.17%

19,414

Fire Department Type
(n=453)

TOTAL

Prevention
Staff as
Percentage of
Total Staff

31,042

936

3.02%

The cities of Toronto, Mississauga and Ottawa, with 130, 41 and 38 full time fire
prevention staff, respectively, account for 209 or 22% of all fire inspectors in the
province. An unexpected finding, however, was that 165 of 453 fire departments (36%)
did not have a single person dedicated to fire prevention activities.
As depicted in Figure 4.1, the MFPP/NFPP data breaks down the types of
agreements between fire departments and third parties.

Fire Service Agreement Types
2014
26 41
4
9

157
11

n = 1172

921

Emergency Response
Fire Prevention
Public Education
Training
Communications/Dispatch
LSB/OFM Corp/FD
Unknown/Unspecified

Figure 4.1 Agreement Types for Ontario Fire Services, 2014
Source: Data, Applications and Technical Support Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management
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Of the 1172 agreement types in place within fire services in Ontario, only 11 (0.9%) of all
formal agreements pertain to fire prevention, inspection services or inspection activities.
The MFPP/NFPP data is not entirely accurate due to misreporting within the 2014
forms. The inadvertent omission of data is to be expected. While guidelines are provided
to assist with entering required information, there is sufficient opportunity to misinterpret
the instructions or simply enter an incorrect value. An example of such an omission as
pertains to this research comes from Middlesex County, where eight municipalities,
excluding the City of London, share in the costs and benefits of fire prevention services.
This agreement was reported by only one of the eight participating local municipalities in
their MFPP/NFPP submission.
A further limitation of this data is that it captures formal agreements only, and does
not capture the informal arrangements that may exist amongst fire chiefs. One such
example exists in Oxford County, where a reciprocal arrangement between Tillsonburg
and South-West Oxford exchanges fire prevention activities for fire training expertise on
an as-needed basis.
Notwithstanding the imperfect data, there is sufficient information to infer that the
purported importance of fire prevention activities as a proactive approach to fire and life
safety is not reflected in a corresponding number of fire prevention officers nor in the
frequency of formalized fire prevention agreements. There is a clear focus on
collaborative arrangements that address emergency response, including
communications/dispatch services.
4.2 Online Survey Results
Electronic responses were downloaded from Interceptum.com into a Microsoft Excel
2010 spreadsheet. This primary data was combined with the secondary data from the
OFMEM and the 2013 Financial Information Returns (FIR) submitted to the Ministry of
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Municipal Affairs and Housing to create a working document. The FIRs provided fire
department adjusted operating budgets and population size. All data was codified and
transferred into IBM SPSS (ver. 23) after verification for accuracy. Original/raw data with
identifiers redacted is available from the author upon written request.
Online responses regarding fire prevention capacity of fire departments support the
findings attained through the secondary data (Appendix F) provided by the FIRs and
OFMEM. 89.7% of fire chiefs rated the number of fire prevention officers/inspectors for
their departments from “average” to “poor”; 77.6% rated the use of certified fire
prevention officers/inspectors as “average” to “poor”; and 81.6% rated their
municipality’s capacity to prosecute for non-compliance as “average” to “poor”. The
OFMEM numbers and the perceptions of fire chiefs demonstrate a clear lack of capacity
in fire prevention activities.
Observations from the survey results generally support the ICA framework. The
conducive and inhibiting factors of voluntary collaboration proposed through the survey
questions supported the literature’s application to fire prevention activities with some
exceptions. Homogeneity of preferences is a factor conducive to collaboration as “costs
related to communication, securing accountability, and the sharing of gains are more
easily handled under conditions of homogeneity than heterogeneity” (Andersen and
Pierre, 2010, 228). Survey results indicate that age range distribution, language(s)
spoken and building stock/fire risk are predominantly “somewhat similar” to “very similar”
in nature. The single outlier appears to be the perception of the mix of industrial,
commercial, and residential properties, which were rated more toward “somewhat
dissimilar” and “very dissimilar”. This category was nuanced from the previous building
stock/fire risk category and did not provide the expected consistent result, owing to it
being a poorly worded or unnecessary category.
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Social capital is clearly well developed amongst fire chiefs in Ontario. Regular
participation at mutual aid meetings, attendance at Ontario Association of Fire Chiefs
conferences, and reciprocal assistance beyond formalized agreements all serve to build
trust in their counterparts’ ability and willingness to meet their contractual obligations.
LeRoux et al. (2010) similarly found that “social networks help to establish trust, create
norms of reciprocity, and reduce transaction costs, thereby increasing the likelihood that
local government officials will engage in service cooperation” (LeRoux, Brandenburger
and Pandy, 2010, 269). While fire chiefs have sufficient social capital to overcome
transaction costs, there remains a scarcity of formalized fire prevention agreements.
Given the perceived need to improve fire prevention activities, it would be valuable for
future research to study if fire chiefs are championing informal or formal collaborative
efforts. As Andrew (2009) points out, well-designed operationalization will be required.
Policy actors such as municipal councils and CAOs are not perceived by fire chiefs to
be inhibiting the collaborative process. Indeed, 78.9% of respondents consider council to
be neutral on the matter, if not willing to collaborate with other councils. Furthermore,
88.8% of fire chiefs perceive the CAO/City Manager as being neutral or receptive to
collaborations. Despite similarities between neighbours,
municipalities are less likely to enter into direct arrangements with
other municipalities because of local politics and policy
incompatibilities” [and even though] “they often share similar
concerns, their attempts to improve conditions are impeded by
administrative turf battles, local politics, and past experiences.
(Andrew, 2009)
A previously stated limitation of this research is that it only polls fire chiefs, not CAOs or
members of council. Further research could survey CAOs to determine their level of
understanding of the need for fire prevention efficacy, or if they would support and put
voluntary fire prevention collaboration on council agendas.
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The benefits of collaboration appear to be understood by survey participants. 70.4%
of respondents “agree” to “strongly agree” that savings on operating budgets could be
achieved or that costs could be deferred, and 75.8% “agree” to “strongly agree” with an
ability to meet regulatory requirements. There was an even greater positive desire for
improved service effectiveness, increased service levels, and that success could lead to
more collaborations. These results are supported by the literature, as Chen and
Thurmaier (2009) state that the “most common reasons for the creation of agreements is
a belief by public officials that an ILA will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of a
public service” (Chen and Thurmaier, 2009, 548). These conducive factors, however, are
still not enough to move the inertia of traditional, response-centric fire departments
towards alternative service delivery mechanisms permitted under the Act.
Transaction costs, predictably, were the greatest inhibiting factors to fire chiefs for
voluntary collaborations. As seen in table 4.2, it was generally perceived to be more
Table 4.2 Transaction Costs Survey Results
Reach
agreement
on fire safety
goals

Easy
Somewhat Easy
Neutral
Somewhat Difficult
Difficult
Total

Freq.
%
36 16.1
120 53.8
42 18.8
21
9.4
4
1.8
223 100.0

Formulate
rules that
govern the
agreement

Fair division
of benefits

Freq.
%
Freq.
%
12
5.4
13
5.8
88 39.5
62
27.8
58 26.0
85
38.1
57 25.6
56
25.1
8
3.6
7
3.1
223 100.0
223 100.0

Equitable
distribution of
costs
Freq.
%
14
6.3
60
26.9
71
31.8
58
26.0
20
9.0
223 100.0

Potential that
some
communities
will not
uphold
agreement
Freq.
%
6
2.7
24
10.8
81
36.3
79
35.4
33
14.8
223 100.0

difficult to formalize agreements, share the benefits and equitably distribute program
costs. Of note are two findings: 1) only 70% felt it would be easy to agree on the goals,
which is surprising given that the stated missions of most fire departments are almost
identical, and 2) despite the trust in other fire chiefs to uphold their commitments, 50% of
respondents felt that it would be “somewhat difficult” to “difficult” to enforce penalties on
communities that do not uphold the agreement. A possible explanation for this apparent
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conflict may be that while penalties may be included within the conditions of a formal
agreement, time constraints placed on fire chiefs’ to monitor adherence to agreement
terms may pose a challenge.
The analysis and findings of section 4.1 answers the research question seeking the
conducive and inhibiting factors of voluntary fire prevention collaborations using the ICA
framework. Section 4.2 examines the three hypotheses as set out in the introduction.
4.2.1 Education Level
The first hypothesis (H1) stated the highest level of education attained by a fire chief
is directly related to a positive perception of the benefits of voluntary collaboration.
H1: The higher the level of a fire chief’s education, the greater the benefits of
collaboration will be positively perceived
H0: Education level has no bearing on the perception of collaboration benefits
The hypothesis sought to explore if higher education levels would have any correlation
with the decision-maker’s probability of understanding the benefits of collaborative
practices. Figure 4.2 illustrates that 30% of respondents had completed community
college and 18% of respondents had some form of university education.

80
n = 223

High school

30%

70

Certificate (incl. Dalhousie,
OFC, Ryerson, AMCTO, etc.)

60
50

20%

Ontario Fire College diploma

18%
40
14%
30

Post-secondary diploma
(community college)

10%

Undergraduate degree

7%

20
10

1%

0
Highest Level Completed
Figure 4.2 Frequency of Education Levels

Graduate degree
Post-graduate degree
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Statistical analysis using ANOVA, however, showed no significance of the education
levels of fire chiefs on their perceived benefits of voluntary collaboration. Using the F-test
of significance, Table 4.3 reveals no value for F larger than the critical factor of 2.10, as
Table 4.3 ANOVA – Education Level to Benefits of Collaboration
Sum of
Squares
Df
Mean Square
Operating budget
Between Groups
5.864
6
.977
savings/cost
Within Groups
170.997
216
.792
deferral
Total
176.861
222
Improved service
Between Groups
3.447
6
.574
effectiveness
Within Groups
129.782
216
.601
Total
133.229
222
Increased service
Between Groups
3.759
6
.626
levels
Within Groups
148.878
216
.689
Total
152.637
222
Sharing costs
Between Groups
1.935
6
.323
makes program
Within Groups
128.047
216
.593
start-up affordable
Total
129.982
222
Success may lead
Between Groups
1.057
6
.176
to more
Within Groups
92.351
216
.428
collaborations
Total
93.408
222
Access to better
Between Groups
4.755
6
.793
trained/certified
Within Groups
169.083
216
.783
inspector(s)
Total
173.839
222
Ability to meet
Between Groups
4.729
6
.788
regulatory
Within Groups
148.984
216
.690
requirements
Total
153.713
222
Long-term
Between Groups
5.496
6
.916
sustainability
Within Groups
144.486
216
.669
Total
149.982
222

F
1.235

Sig.
.290

.956

.456

.909

.489

.544

.774

.412

.871

1.012

.418

1.143

.339

1.369

.228

determined by the degrees of freedom (Df). The null hypothesis (H0) stated that
education level has no bearing on the perception of collaboration benefits. Based on the
ANOVA, H0 cannot be rejected. Similar results, that fire chiefs appear to positively
perceive voluntary collaborations, were noted across the other independent variables.
This is contrary to a perception in academia that “professional public managers with an
MPA degree share a common commitment to values of efficiency and equity imparted by
a master’s education that may make them more inclined toward collective problem
solving” (Leroux, Brandenburger and Pandy, 2010, 271). Conversely, in a separately run
ANOVA, there was no statistical significance of educational level influencing the ease or
difficulty in overcoming transaction costs.
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4.2.2 Fire Department Type and Member Resistance to Collaboration
H2 hypothesized that members of full time fire departments would resist attempts at
voluntary collaboration.
H2: If the workplace is unionized, then firefighters would oppose collaboration
H0: There is no difference in opposition to collaboration based on unionization
The assumption of H2 is that there is often language within collective agreements over
“ownership” of the work typically done by association members and whose executive
bargaining agent would be reluctant to negotiate away such rights. This would potentially
limit collaborative efforts to work with other fire departments, particularly if work was to
be done by someone from outside of the bargaining unit. Survey responses were
generally evenly mixed by frequency, as depicted in Figure 4.3.
90
80

38%
n = 223

70

Strongly Agree

26%

60

26%

Agree

50

Neutral

40

Disagree

30

Strongly Disagree

8%

20
10

2%

0
Responses
Figure 4.3 Response to Statement “Department members would oppose collaboration”

However, when analyzed by Department Type in Table 4.4, the mean shows fire chiefs
of full time departments responded with “agreed” and “strongly agreed” more so than fire
chiefs from composite fire departments, whose mean was closer to “neutral”. Fire chiefs
of volunteer departments tended to respond with “disagree” and “strongly disagree”,
reflecting the nature of their workforce and predominantly non-unionized workplaces.
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Table 4.4 Fire Department Type to Opposition by Members
95% Confidence Interval
for Mean
Std.
Std.
Lower
Upper
N
Mean Deviation
Error
Bound
Bound
Volunteer
73
3.47
.944
.110
3.25
3.69
Composite
122
3.21
.964
.087
3.04
3.39
FT/Career
28
2.71
1.049
.198
2.31
3.12
Total
223
3.23
.991
.066
3.10
3.36

Minimum Maximum
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5

Statistical analysis using ANOVA in Table 4.5 further verifies significant findings
with a large F-value of 6.15 exceeding the critical value of 2.99 with p ≤ 0.005.
Table 4.5 ANOVA - Department Members Would Oppose Collaboration
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
11.537
206.338
217.874

Df
2
220
222

Mean Square
5.768
.938

F
6.150

Sig.
.003

At least two of the groups differed significantly from each other, in this case full time and
volunteer departments. The null hypothesis (H0) is rejected. The variance supports the
H2 hypotheses to the extent that the presence of organized labour in a workplace cannot
be ruled out as a significant factor inhibiting voluntary collaboration in fire prevention
activities.
The Institutional Collective Action literature reviewed for this research was silent on
the issue of organized labour. The aspect of ICA research focusing on institutional actors
deals with high-level policy decision makers, from senior bureaucrats to politicians.
There was no reference or discussion found pertaining to the influence of collective
action by workers which, ironically, occupies important roles within institutional theories
and organizational behavior. As the ICA literature predominantly arises from the United
States, with considerable contributions originating out of Florida, one plausible
explanation for this lack of consideration of the impact of unionization is that Florida is a
‘Right to Work’ state. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Florida’s rate of
union membership is 5.7% of total employment, which ranks 35th in the nation (USBLS,
2014).
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4.2.3 Fire Chief Resistance to Collaboration
H3 posits that fire chiefs would resist voluntary collaboration if they thought it would
weaken their decision-making authority or even lead to loss of their job.
H3: If the fire chief felt his/her position or authority was at risk, then he/she would
oppose collaboration
H0: Fire chiefs do not feel collaboration will result in loss of position or authority
Consideration for self-preservation of authority and position is consistent with the
literature. Thurmaier and Wood (2002) acknowledged that “it is not easy to separate
individuals from their organizations when one analyzes the dynamics of ILAs (Thurmaier
and Wood, 2002, 587)”. Feiock et al. (2010) further write:
If we assume that institutional actors act in a self-interested manner by
selecting the available strategy that most enhances their (generally shortterm) interests, then absent regional institutions, the collective action
problem dictates that the outcomes of individual decisions will lead to
collectively inefficient decisions. (Feiock, Lee, Park and Lee, 2010, 243)
As proxies for resistance to collaborations, potential inhibiting factors of career harm
and loss of decision-making authority were separately set against all dependent
variables for ANOVA. The summary of F-values and critical factors are shown below in
Table 4.6:
Table 4.6 Summary of F-values and Critical Factors for Fire Chief Resistance to Collaboration
My career would be harmed by
I would resist any loss of
collaborating
decision-making authority
Variable
F
Sig.
C.F.
F
Sig.
C.F.
Population
.537
.586
2.99
.915
.402
2.99

Type of Municipality

2.093

.126

2.99

.247

.781

2.99

Type of Department

1.415

.245

2.99

.560

.572

2.99

Operating Budget

2.944

.055

2.99

2.247

.108

2.99

Education Level

1.068

.373

2.37

1.538

.192

2.37
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The only F-value that approaches the critical factor is 2.944 for operating budget.
Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0), that fire chiefs do not feel collaboration will result in
loss of position or authority, cannot be rejected. While section 4.2 answered the three
hypotheses as set out in the introduction, section 4.3 provides increased understanding
of the applicability of the ICA framework to three fire service in Ontario.
4.3 Qualitative Data from Interviews
4.3.1 Central York Fire Services
Aurora and Newmarket, Ontario, situated within York Region, voluntarily consolidated
their fire departments into the Central York Fire Services on 01 January 2002.
Governance of the fire department is provided by a Joint Council Committee (JCC),
consisting of three (3) Aurora council members and three (3) Newmarket council
members. Annual reports are made to both municipal councils. Direction comes from the
JCC, not individual councils. On a day-to-day basis, the Fire Chief reports to the
Newmarket CAO.
In 2000, with a Newmarket Deputy Fire Chief running Aurora Fire Department as
Acting Fire Chief, several meetings were held with politicians to gauge their support for
consolidation. The Newmarket CAO, Dennis Perlin, asserted that all parties needed to
be on board or there likely would not be an agreement. Bargaining unit resistance would
be a major barrier unless they could see the benefits. The executive committees of both
firefighter associations were invited to these meetings and were informed on what was
being considered. Both associations were asked if they were willing to participate as a
party to the process; to which they agreed and became key stakeholders. The
associations jointly provided a draft collective agreement to the towns, which were
agreed to by the municipalities (Laing and Comeau, Interview, 2015). The new
agreement provided for an averaging up to the highest common standard for salaries,
benefits, health and safety. It also had provisions that safeguarded employee
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employment in case of dissolution. The need to negotiate, admittedly with improved and
more expensive terms and conditions, in order to overcome contractual barriers was
considered less costly for each municipality working to achieve collective benefits than
trying to provide higher levels of in-house services with significantly increased costs
(Laing and Comeau, Interview, 2015).
Characterized by Chief Laing as a great success, the perceived benefits were initially
financial, but the long term value was increased effectiveness. In its 2008 annual report,
the impetus for consolidation was cost deferral with “the ability to meet the minimum
requirements for fire protection without having to pay the extra costs needed to do so
independently. In addition, improved levels of service and a broader range of services
have been made available as a result of consolidation that would not be available to the
municipalities separately, without significantly increased costs” (CYFS, 2008, 6). The
gains realized through cost avoidance, economies and operational efficiencies were
perceived to be less than the transactional costs associated with bringing the two
departments together, even with leveling up of full time salaries and benefits.
4.3.2 Wellington County Fire Training Officer
Wellington County consists of the municipalities of Centre Wellington, Erin, GuelphEramosa, Mapleton, Minto, Puslinch and Wellington North. Working out of an office at
the Centre Wellington Fire Department headquarters since 2011, the Wellington Training
Officer serves all seven municipalities. The Training Officer is considered an employee
of Centre Wellington, however, Centre Wellington invoices the county on a quarterly
basis for 100% of the costs, including administration, vehicle usage, salary and benefits.
Championed by Fire Chief Brad Patton of Centre Wellington, discussions within the
Wellington County Fire Chiefs Association began in 2009, as the fire chiefs were looking
very closely at Meaford’s near-fatal fire incident and the Point Edward training fatality;
both events saw members of the municipal fire department charged under the
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Occupational Health and Safety Act (Patton, Interview, 2015). There was a significant
change in training requirements by the Ministry of Labour, such as training officer
qualifications, documentation of lesson plans, records of delivery, evaluation and
maintenance of records. The training delivery model of individual fire departments at the
time was not sustainable in its present format, as training delivery and documentation
requirements were determined by the local fire chiefs to be inadequate.
The costs of an additional salary and benefits absorbed by the county seems to have
less importance than the apparent risk to fire chiefs and local municipalities. There have
been many benefits of the shared Training Officer position. Through increased training
interactions, neighboring stations are working much better together at mutual aid
incidents. The quality of training has improved and is more consistent across the county,
resulting in improved teamwork on fire scenes. The Training Officer has helped to build
relationships, trust and knowledge amongst the departments’ members. In addition, the
Training Officer has been able to coordinate resources that were previously being underutilized. The fire chiefs quickly learned that the volunteer training officers, who were
Associate Instructors in various disciplines under the previous Ontario curriculum, were
all within the county, but not being utilized collectively until after the Training Officer
started coordinating them.
According to Chief Patton, there is no rigid structure for time allocation. “It very much
relies on cooperation and the Training Officer’s self-direction based on demand and
expressed needs and priorities stated by the local chiefs and local training officers”
(Patton, Interview, 2015). The structure is left intentionally informal. Time spent with
constituent fire departments seems to have balanced itself out over the years. There
have been no complaints from any of the local fire chiefs pertaining to the amount of
time spent by the Training Officer in their respective municipalities. There is a high
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degree of social capital amongst the fire chiefs developed over the years with strong
relationships based on trust and reciprocity to allow for such cooperation.
4.3.3 Middlesex County Fire Prevention Officer
Middlesex County consists of the municipalities of Adelaide-Metcalfe, LucanBiddulph, Middlesex Centre, Newbury, North Middlesex, Southwest Middlesex,
Strathroy-Caradoc and Thames Centre. The eight municipalities share the services of a
full time and part time Fire Prevention Officer. First implemented 01 January 1998, each
municipality pays a levy to the county to cover the costs of salaries and benefits of both
the full time and contracted part time employees. Reporting to the County Engineer
responsible for emergency services, the Fire Prevention Officers are appointed by each
municipality as an Assistant to the Fire Marshal.
Strathroy Fire Chief Bill Gibson, the only full time fire chief in the county at the time,
was the champion for a shared fire inspector. Chief Gibson recognized the need for
increased fire inspections by a competent person, as the Office of the Fire Marshal was
reducing its field assistance for inspections (Elston, Interview, 2015) and “the FPPA was
forthcoming with new fire inspection and public education requirements” (Bellchamber,
Interview, 2015). The collaboration began as an informal agreement between Middlesex
County CAO and City of London CAO to have London Fire Department (LFD) provide
fire inspection and investigation services to the county.
By 2004, local councils became concerned about the inability to control the
increasing costs from LFD (Elston, Interview, 2015). Still wanting to continue the
program, local fire chiefs and CAOs within the county recognized that they could
contract with an individual fire inspector independent of LFD. This individual started in
October 2004 and still continues on a part time basis in conjunction with the full time Fire
Prevention Officer.
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The main benefits have been increased quantity and quality of fire safety inspections.
There is now a standard approach to fire safety inspections across the county.
Inspections are not just complaint and request-based, but they also conduct routine
inspections that exceed the minimum requirement of the regulation. They can also meet
the inspection frequency requirements for vulnerable occupancies throughout the entire
county. There are fewer false alarms, as owners are maintaining their fire alarm
systems. Fire spread and losses are mitigated because of maintained fire separations
and enhanced early detection.
4.3.4 Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management
The Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management (OFMEM) is a branch of
the Community Safety Division of the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional
Services (MCSCS). As the top bureaucrat of the organization, the Fire Marshal and
Chief of Emergency Management advises the deputy minister, minister and cabinet on
matters of public fire safety policy. As well as administering the FPPA and the OFC, the
OFMEM provides a wide range of programs and activities in support of local
municipalities in providing “adequate levels of fire prevention and protection in
accordance with the needs and circumstances of the areas they serve” (About the Office
of the Fire Marshal) under the requirements of the act.
The OFMEM wants local governments to take a balanced approach to prevention. It
strongly encourages the enforcement of the fire code, where necessary and appropriate.
There are some municipalities, however, that are still reluctant to do this. They either do
not realize the importance of inspection and enforcement or they lack the skills and/or
resources to effectively inspect and/or enforce (Jessop, Interview, 2015).
As to perceived gaps pertaining to fire inspectors, the legislation does not have
adequacy standards. While qualifications for building inspectors are required, there is
currently only one required qualification under the FPPA; training for Chief Fire Officials
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responsible for approving fire safety plans for vulnerable occupancies. According to Jim
Jessop, the Interim Fire Marshal and Chief of Emergency Management, “the OFMEM is
in the process of finishing, with imminent release, requirements for all Assistants to the
Fire Marshals to take training” (Jessop, Interview, 2015).
Although there are some impediments to the effective delivery of fire prevention
activities, particularly in rural areas, there is no consideration of forced consolidation or
amalgamation by the province at this point (Jessop, Interview, 2015). This is counter to
the literature that suggests that the province may impose solutions upon local
governments when they fail to adequately implement provincial policy.
As well, there is no indication that the OFMEM is looking at mandating professional
qualification standards for fire inspectors. Requiring volunteer fire departments to certify
its members to the same standard as full time departments would be an unfunded
mandate. Fire chiefs from smaller municipalities claim that they do not have the
resources and any further requirements would make it difficult to recruit and retain
volunteers (Jessop, 2015). This argument by fire chiefs is certainly true for fire
suppression, which has a greater dependence on human resources for service
effectiveness and safety, but it is difficult to use the same rationale for a single, perhaps
shared fire prevention position.
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Strengths and Implications of the Study
A key strength of the study is that it is original research for fire services in Ontario.
The limited ICA literature pertaining to fire services has primarily focused on mutual aid
agreements. The study will serve to inform decision-makers at the provincial and local
levels of government. The OFMEM has expressed interest in the outcome of this
research as it contributes, in part, to the evaluation of its public fire safety policy and
understanding of municipalities’ implementation of their responsibilities under the FPPA.
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It further serves to inform local leaders, particularly those who can span the politicaladministrative dichotomy, on factors to weigh when considering alternative service
delivery options which may include collective action.
This research also creates implications for other service areas within the municipal
sector. Local officials may consider the co-provision of selected services such as human
resources, information technology, building, public works or transportation departments.
Morton et al. (2008) caution, however, that collaboration is not merely an economic and
effectiveness decision for small towns, as the sense of community from highly visible
services can be equally as important to residents. Municipal decision-makers informed
by an engaged public “might selectively choose nonvisible, routine portions of public
services to share while directly providing those services that seem most important to
their residents” (Morton, Chen and Morse, 2008, 59). This is consistent with direct
provision of emergency response services and less visible service agreements for
dispatch and fire prevention activities.
5.2 Limitations of the Study and Future Research
This study has two apparent limitations. The secondary data from the OFMEM only
includes formal fire prevention agreements and the survey only polled decision makers
in the role of fire chief. Informal collaborations, which are part of the ICA spectrum, were
not measured. Anecdotal evidence from Oxford County and the literature suggest that
there may be more informal arrangements than recognized. Future research should try
to determine the prevalence and scope of informal arrangements and the frequency of
informal fire prevention collaborations, in particular. As senior administrators with strong
networks may “regularly propose new collaborative arrangements to their respective
elected officials” (Chen and Thurmaier, 2009, 540), future study could also ascertain if
fire chiefs have initiated collective action discussions with their colleagues from adjacent
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municipalities, their CAOs, or presented an alternative service delivery mechanism
business case to council.
The second limitation of the study was that the perspective of voluntary collaboration
was restricted to fire chiefs. CAOs were not included in the survey. CAOs are key
decision-makers and their leadership is critical for steering collaborative efforts and
putting the issue and solution on council’s agenda. Consideration for further study could
include a survey directed at CAOs/City Managers to gauge their awareness of fire
prevention gaps, their willingness to engage in collaborative fire prevention efforts,
whether they expect the fire chief to prepare and present the business case for voluntary
collaboration, and which contextual factors might have the greatest influence on whether
the issue is put on council’s agenda.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
Fire prevention activities vary greatly across the province. Non-standardized service
levels, from minimum qualifications to inadequate allocation of personnel resources,
adversely impact non-standardized frequencies of fire safety inspections for most major
occupancies. Even meeting the minimum regulated requirements for inspections upon
complaint or request and vulnerable occupancies is a challenge for many departments.
Traditional in-house service delivery methods with its emphasis on emergency
response are slow to change, and while alternative service delivery methods have been
permitted under the Act since 1997, few formalized agreements for fire prevention
activities exist. This research is important because in the current economic, political and
social climate in which New Public Management techniques are normative, innovative
solutions to better manage changing institutions are required. Institutional Collective
Action (ICA) is a voluntary collaborative arrangement between one or more
municipalities for the coordination or joint provision of a local service.
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The research question of this study was “What are the conducive and inhibiting
factors of voluntary collaboration for fire prevention activities within Ontario’s fire
service?” A triangulation approach was taken to answer the question. Secondary data
from the OFMEM and MMAH was used in conjunction with primary data from an online
survey to fire chiefs to first confirm that there was even a perceived need for
collaboration. The survey design followed the theoretical framework of ICA, with the bulk
of the survey data being used to explore homogeneity of communities, networking and
social capital amongst fire chiefs, benefits of collaboration, transaction costs, and policy
actors such as CAOs and elected officials. Attaining a response rate of half of the small
target population, the results are generalizable across Ontario’s fire service. The findings
are consistent with the ICA literature, although there is little evidence of formal
collaborative efforts.
Primary data generated from the online survey to fire chiefs represents factors
conducive to voluntary fire prevention collaborations. These favorable attributes include
a close similarity between communities, strong relationships with a high degree of trust
amongst fire chiefs, the recognition of the increased efficacy of fire prevention activities
and possible cost avoidance, and a perception that CAOs and councils are receptive to
working with their neighbouring municipalities. Transaction costs associated with
negotiating the rules to govern the agreement, fairly dividing the benefits, ensuring an
equitable distribution of costs , and monitoring and enforcing the terms of the agreement
appear to be more challenging to resolve, but are not immovable barriers to overcome.
Three hypotheses were advanced to evaluate the extent of acceptance or resistance
by key stakeholders, specifically fire chiefs and firefighter associations, to voluntarily
collaborating with other fire departments for fire prevention services. For the first
hypothesis (H1), which stated that the higher the level of a fire chief’s education, the
greater the benefits of collaboration would be positively perceived, the null hypothesis
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could not be ruled out. The benefits of collaboration were generally perceived equally
positive, regardless of education level. The second hypothesis (H2) stated if the
workplace was unionized, then firefighters would oppose collaboration. This was true
primarily for full time fire departments and the results were statistically significant to
permit the null hypothesis to be ruled out. Hypothesis three (H3) postulated if the fire
chief felt that his/her position or authority was at risk, then the fire chief would oppose
collaboration. Again, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. Fire chiefs do not appear
to feel threatened by the prospect of entering collaborative arrangements with other fire
departments.
The qualitative aspect of the study provided a greater level of understanding of the
impetus for voluntary collaborations and the role of the fire chief as an agent of change.
Interviews with past and present fire chiefs and other key players reiterated the need for
improved effectiveness of service delivery. Strong relationships are important to advance
discussions, implementation and sustainability of collaborations.
Fire departments of all sizes and types are facing similar needs for improved fire
safety inspections with increased frequency. Institutional Collective Action provides a
broad range of mechanisms to address the economic, political and societal challenges
faced by many fire departments. While not a panacea, the ICA framework offers a
spectrum of mitigating mechanisms sufficiently flexible to account for temporal and
spatial contexts. Local municipalities considering alternative service delivery options for
fire prevention activities might explore opportunities to voluntarily collaborate with one or
more of their neighbours to meet their local needs and circumstances.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A – MFPP/NFPP Agreement Details
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Appendix B – Dependent Variable Categories and Descriptions
Dependent Variable
Category

Perceived Fire Prevention
Capacity

Demographic Homogeneity

Networking with other Fire
Chiefs

Perceived Benefits of
Collaboration

Perceived Costs of
Collaboration

Policy Actors Resistance to
Collaboration

Description
In light of current fire prevention activities, determine if
there is a need for collaboration based on perceived
gaps in regulatory requirements, minimum program of
complaints and request, number of fire inspectors,
number of certified inspectors, and capacity to
prosecute for non-compliance.
It has been shown that municipalities with similar
characteristics are more likely to voluntarily
collaborate due to similarity of citizen preferences.
Established social, professional and/or policy
networks serve to build relationships and trust, which
may facilitate collaborations, particularly when
positive outcomes have been previously achieved.
It is argued that improved service effectiveness,
increased service levels, economies of scale and
other cost savings can be obtained through
collectively working together in the provision of
services.
Costs associated with collaboration may include the
uncertainty of process and outcomes along with
limited information during negotiations, start-up costs,
the maintenance, monitoring and enforcement costs,
and the potential for late-comers trying to be
opportunistic and benefit from the work done by
others. The theory suggests that when these costs
are higher than the benefits, collaborative efforts
become difficult. Conversely, when benefits are
higher than the costs, collaboration becomes easier.
Municipalities and professional associations have
their own cultures, values and belief systems.
Individuals are influenced by such institutions but this
is moderated by their own perceptions and
preferences. The likelihood of collaborations occurring
or not occurring is related, in part, to the extent of
municipal and individual alignment.
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Appendix C – Online Survey Questions and Response Coding
BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
This section gathers some basic background information about you and your
department’s fire prevention capacity.
1. How do you perceive the delivery of fire prevention services within your community?
Ability to meet regulatory inspection requirements
Ability to exceed the minimum inspection requirements
Number of fire prevention officers / inspectors
Use of certified fire prevention officers / inspectors
Capacity to prosecute for non-compliance
Excellent=1, Above Average=2, Average=3, Below Average=4, Poor=5

2. What is the highest level of education you have attained?
High school
Certificate (including OFC, Dalhousie, Ryerson, AMCTO, etc.)
Ontario Fire College diploma
Post-secondary diploma (community college)
Undergraduate degree
Graduate degree
Post-graduate degree

=1
=2
=3
=4
=5
=6
=7

COMMUNITY PROFILE:
This section gathers some basic background information on the composition of your
community. It has been shown that municipalities with similar characteristics are more
likely to voluntarily collaborate.
3. My perceptions of the extent of similarity or difference between my municipality and
neighbouring communities are:
Age Range Distribution
Industrial / Commercial / Residential Mix
Topographic / Natural Features
Language(s) Spoken
Ethnic Origin
Household Income
Building Stock / Fire Risk
Very Similar (1), Somewhat Similar (2), Neutral (3), Somewhat Dissimilar (4), Very Dissimilar (5), Do Not Know (6)
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NETWORKING:
Research indicates that established social, professional and/or policy networks serve to
build relationships and trust which may facilitate collaborations, particularly when
positive outcomes have been previously achieved.
4. For each of the following statements, rate your interactions with area fire chiefs.
I regularly attend mutual aid meetings
I regularly attend OFMEM seminars and/or the OFC
I help out area fire chiefs where I can without charge
I socialize with area fire chiefs regularly
I regularly attend OAFC seminars/conferences
I trust my fellow fire chiefs to honour their commitments
Strongly Agree (1), Agree (2), Neutral (3), Disagree (4), Strongly Disagree (5)

COLLABORATION BENEFITS:
It is argued that improved service effectiveness, increased service levels, economies of
scale and other cost savings can be obtained through collectively working together in the
provision of services.
5. Fire prevention collaborations can produce the following benefits:
Operating budget savings/cost deferral
Improved service effectiveness
Increased service levels
Sharing costs makes program start-up affordable
Success may lead to more collaborations
Access to better trained/certified inspector(s)
Ability to meet regulatory requirements
Long-term sustainability
Strongly Agree (1), Agree (2), Neutral (3), Disagree (4), Strongly Disagree (5), Do Not Know (6)
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COLLABORATION COSTS:
Costs associated with collaboration may include the uncertainty of process and
outcomes along with limited information during negotiations, start-up costs, the
maintenance, monitoring and enforcement costs, and the potential for late-comers trying
to be opportunistic and benefit from the work done by others. The theory suggests that
when these costs are higher than the benefits, collaborative efforts become difficult.
Conversely, when benefits are higher than the costs, collaboration becomes easier.
6. For each of the following potential barriers to fire prevention collaboration, rate the
degree of ease or difficulty to resolve:
Reach agreement on fire safety goals
Formulate rules that govern the agreement
Information discrepancies
Reach agreement on how inputs and outputs will be monitored
Fair division of benefits from collaboration
Equitable distribution of costs
Potential that some communities will not uphold agreement
Potential that a late-comer will want to join the agreement
Somewhat Easy (1), Easy (2), Neutral (3), Somewhat Difficult (4), Difficult (5)

KEY PLAYERS:
Municipalities and professional associations have their own cultures, values and belief
systems. Individuals are influenced by such institutions but this is moderated by their
own perceptions and preferences. The likelihood of collaborations occurring or not
occurring is related, in part, to the extent of municipal and individual alignment.
7. For each of the following key players and decision-makers, indicate how you
perceive their receptiveness to collaborations:
Council is willing to collaborate with other councils
My career would be harmed by collaborating
Department members would oppose collaboration
Collaboration would help politicians get (re)elected
I would resist any loss of decision-making authority
The CAO/City Manager is receptive to collaborations
Strongly Agree (1), Agree (2), Neutral (3),Disagree (4), Strongly Disagree (5), Do Not Know (6)
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Appendix D – 34 Excluded Fire Departments
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Appendix E – Case Study Interview Questions
Interviewee:

Dept.:

Location:

Date:

Interviewer:

Time:

Discussion of Interview Request Letter:
Permission to Record:

No □

No □

Yes □

Yes □

1. When did discussions on collaboration begin and when did the agreement take
effect?
2. Why pursue collaboration at that particular time?
3. Who championed discussions on collaboration?
4. Who were the key stakeholders in discussions?
5. What were the perceived benefits of collaboration?
6. What were the barriers that had to be overcome?
7. How were the collective action barriers overcome?
8. What critical factors sustain the collaboration?
9. How is the collaboration governed?
10. How would you characterize the results or impact of the collaborative effort?
11. Are there any ongoing challenges or sustainability issues?
12. What outcome measures, if any, are used to evaluate program performance?
13. Other question(s) to add based on the conversation of the interview…
Privacy Concerns:
Eliminate Questions:
Request for Prior Review:

No □

Yes □

End Time:
Thank You Letter to be Provided Within 3 Business Days: No □
conditions)

Yes □ (include
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Appendix F – Independent Variable Frequency Table
Note: Original data from the FIRs and OFMEM with identifiers redacted is available from
the author upon written request.
Type of Municipality

Valid

Single Tier
Lower Tier
NFPP
Total

Frequency
70
140
13

Percent
31.4
62.8
5.8

Valid Percent
31.4
62.8
5.8

223

100.0

100.0

Cumulative
Percent
31.4
94.2
100.0

Type of Department

Valid

Volunteer
Composite
FT/Career
Total

Frequency
73
122
28

Percent
32.7
54.7
12.6

Valid Percent
32.7
54.7
12.6

223

100.0

100.0

Cumulative
Percent
32.7
87.4
100.0

Firefighters' Association

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency
159
64

Percent
71.3
28.7

Valid Percent
71.3
28.7

223

100.0

100.0

Cumulative
Percent
71.3
100.0

Formal Fire Prevention Agreements

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency
210
13

Percent
94.2
5.8

Valid Percent
94.2
5.8

223

100.0

100.0

Cumulative
Percent
94.2
100.0

Population Size

Valid

<10,000
10K - 99,999
100,000K+
Total

Frequency
127
78
18

Percent
57.0
35.0
8.1

Valid Percent
57.0
35.0
8.1

223

100.0

100.0

Cumulative
Percent
57.0
91.9
100.0
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Adjusted Operating Budget

Valid

<$500,000
$500-$999K
$1Million+
Total

Frequency
85
45
93

Percent
38.1
20.2
41.7

Valid Percent
38.1
20.2
41.7

223

100.0

100.0

Cumulative
Percent
38.1
58.3
100.0

Educational Level

Valid

High school
Certificate (including OFC,
Dalhousie, Ryerson, AMCTO, etc.)
Ontario Fire College diploma
Post-secondary diploma
(community college)
Undergraduate degree
Graduate degree
Post-graduate degree
Total

Frequency Percent
40
17.9

Valid
Percent
17.9

Cumulative
Percent
17.9

31

13.9

13.9

31.8

45

20.2

20.2

52.0

67

30.0

30.0

82.1

22
16
2

9.9
7.2
.9

9.9
7.2
.9

91.9
99.1
100.0

223

100.0

100.0

